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Abstract 
Before the full implementation of CO2 capture and storage, a demonstration of its safety is needed through the implementation of 
reliable risk management methods. One important aspect of risk management is the development of mitigation measures that 
prevent any risk to the environment or human health. This paper presents a database that includes a set of risk mitigation 
measures, their description and main properties, and references. They are organised in connection with a detailed approach of risk 
events developed into bow-tie diagrams by BRGM. The goal of the database is to help the setting up of corrective measure plans 
that will be mandatory for all projects under the European directive on CO2 storage. 
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1. Introduction 
CO2 capture and storage (CCS) is seen as a promising technology to achieve large reductions in atmospheric 
greenhouse gas emissions. The demonstration of the safety of the storage stage is needed before the full 
implementation of this technique: one important aspect is to study and to take an inventory on possible risk 
mitigation measures. In particular, the European directive on CCS requires that an operator submits a corrective 
measure plan in order to obtain the necessary storage permit. The application for the storage permit must also 
contain a description of measures to prevent potential “significant irregularities” [1]. Consequently, operators 
willing to prepare a permit application for a future storage project and authorities that will have to review these 
applications need to know potential risk mitigation measures for all risks identified for geological storage of CO2.  
A first overview of potential mitigation measures was given by Benson & Hepple [2], and was largely taken up 
by the IPCC special report [3]. Other references on this subject include the publications by IEA-GHG [4] and Perry 
[5]. Even though these references are very useful for giving an overview of different measures, they only provide a 
general list with little or no description of the measures. Moreover, these measures are presented according to a 
precise purpose but are not integrated in a full risk scenario management strategy. The simple inventory of potential 
measures thus leads to two main gaps: first, the precise identification of what are the best options for mitigating a 
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specific scenario is difficult; second, when an operator can set-up several different measures for the same final 
purpose, he needs more specific knowledge on each option so he can make the best decision. We thus developed a 
database, entitled GERICO, containing risk management measures for CO2 geological storage, with the goal of 
bridging those two main gaps. In particular, the first gap was tackled by developing, for a variety of risk events, 
bow-tie diagrams combined with safety barriers. The second gap was tackled by developing each measure into 
individual sheets with descriptions and useful parameters. 
2. Methodology for the conception of the risk management database 
2.1. Terminology 
As briefly mentioned above, our global approach is based on bow-tie diagrams (figure 2). These tools are widely 
used in industrial and technological risk management and represent graphically the risk sequences (or scenarios) 
that might lead to undesirable effects (or impacts). Structurally speaking, these diagrams are centered on a major 
risk event (or top event); its possible causes are given upstream of the diagram as well as the possible consequences 
downstream. Major risk events, causes and consequences are all represented as boxes that we name episodes and the 
combination between these different episodes constitutes a risk scenario. This tree-like representation allows the 
positioning of safety barriers (or measures) before an episode to prevent it, or after an episode to eliminate and 
lower the consequences [6]. 
2.2. Application of bow-tie diagrams to the CO2 storage case 
The development of the diagrams was based on a generic list of 11 main risk events modified from an existing 
list described in [7]. These constitute the top risk events, which represent the potential deviations from the expected 
behaviour of the storage complex and were identified based on a series of expert judgement workshops. 
1. Leakage via an operational well 
2. Mechanical disruption nearby the injection well 
3. Mechanical disruption at the storage complex scale 
4. Expected lateral extent exceeded 
5. Leakage due to sealing deficiency of the caprock 
6. Leakage via existing faults 
7. Leakage via an abandoned well 
8. Accumulation in a secondary reservoir 
9. Flow modifications 
10. Disruption by a later activity 
11. Disruption by a natural earthquake. 
 
Risks must be managed during all stages of a storage project i.e. during the planning stage, during the operational 
stage and after the transfer of responsibility. As our goal was to identify for each major risk event all possible 
“levers” for risk mitigation, we had to include the time-scale component in the diagrams; we then decided to 
develop for each event one diagram per phase: 
 A diagram for the planning phase: causes are here potential evolutions of the storage site for given settings and 
injection scenarios. Associated measures can be taken by operators before the start of the operations in order to 
lower the initial level of risk. 
 A diagram for the operational phase: we consider that the normal evolution scenario is known. This diagram is 
then only focused on the differences with this scenario: the sequences describe the alternative evolution scenarios 
and the causes are either under the responsibility of the operator or due to external events. 
 A diagram for the long term phase (after transfer of responsibility) similar to the previous one but focused on the 
long terms risks; please note that in this paper the two former diagrams will be presented, the long term trees 
being still under development. 
In concrete terms, each event was linked with causes episodes and consequences episodes, eventually identifying 
impacts on vulnerable elements as the ultimate consequence. Links between the main risk events were also created. 
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The notion of compartment was introduced in the diagrams for added precision: the main compartment is the so-
called zone of influence. We define the zone of influence as the expected zone in which the sources of hazards (e.g. 
free gaseous CO2, pressure) can have an influence. For instance, if the free gaseous CO2 is the source of hazards, the 
area of influence will be the expected extension of the plume. Conversely, outside the zone of influence can be an 
overlying zone, including the confining layer, or inside the storage formation but further from the injection(s) 
well(s). The episodes were placed either inside the zone of influence, outside the zone of influence or in transition 
between the zones. 
The diagrams were checked for comprehensiveness through an audit against a generic list of FEPs [8] (Features, 
Events, Processes). 
2.3. Identification and development of mitigation measures 
For each episode created in the different diagrams, we attempted to find measures that could be applied before 
the episode, in order to avoid it, or after the episode, to eliminate or lower its consequences. For the planning phase 
only measures before the episodes were needed. For each measure identified, a description sheet was then created 
and filled. We did not take in consideration as safety barriers the action of the natural barriers of the system (e.g. the 
caprock), as they are included in the expected behaviour. 
2.4. Creation of the database 
The last step was to integrate all the previous work in one database. We used MS ACCESS©. 
2.5. Remediation measures 
Remediation measures are the measures to be taken when environmental damage or hazardous phenomena due to 
the storage operations occurs. Such damage could in turn impact human health. The goal of these measures is to 
rehabilitate or restore the impaired natural resources in the baseline state. As such, their presence in a risk 
management database is worthwhile. Those measures are linked to the nature of the impact but not to the origin of 
the hazard and therefore, they are not directly linked with the main risk events. A separate work on those measures 
was hence undertaken.  
The first step of this work was to identify all different impacts that CO2 geological storage activities could create 
on the environment, and then to identify potential measures able to eliminate or mitigate those impacts. This work 
was carried out with analogy to the field of contaminated sites, based on BRGM experience ([9]). As for now, those 
measures are not yet implemented in the database and their development is still going on. The impacts and the 
associated remediation measures are listed in association with several conceptual models. 
3. Results 
3.1. The GERICO database 
As an example, we use the event n°7: Leakage via an abandoned well. The diagram created for the planning 
phase is shown on figure 1, and the diagram created for the operational phase is shown on figure 2. 
In these diagrams, an arrow linking two episodes should be read “can possibly induce”.  
We see that this event can originate either from the storage zone, if a leakage pathway has not been detected by 
the operator prior to the operations or outside the storage zone, if CO2 has migrated in an unexpected manner.  
The potential hazards that apply to the central event (i.e. “top event”) are outlined underneath. Here, the hazard 
can be a leak of either CO2 and associated impurities or of brine. Mechanical energy is also a potential hazard for 
some other events.  
Some mitigation measures identified for this diagram are listed in table 1. 
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Figure 1: Planning phase diagram for event n°7: “Leakage via an abandoned well”. Only the upper part of the diagram is shown, as consequences 
are similar to the operational phase diagram. 
Table 1: Extract of the list of mitigation measures associated with the diagram of the event n°7 
Planning phase Operational phase 
Episode Mitigation measure Episode Mitigation Measure 
Resulting fracturing Re-abandonment Expected lateral extent 
exceeded 
Produce and re-inject CO2 
Presence of a leakage 
pathway 
Re-abandonment Accumulation in a 
secondary reservoir 
Hydraulic Barrier 
Loss of integrity with time Use of chemical additives Accumulation in a 
secondary reservoir 
Produce and re-inject CO2 
Presence of abandoned 
wells in the selected site 
Change site Presence of a leakage 
pathway 
Re-abandonment 
Leakage of CO2  Enhance CO2 trapping Presence of an unexpected 
leakage pathway 
Re-abandonment 
Leakage of brine Pressure control strategies Ignorance of the presence 
of abandoned well 
Investigations for 
abandoned wells 
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Figure 2: Operational phase diagram for event n°7: “Leakage via an abandoned well” 
 
Figure 3: Implementation of the diagrams inside the GERICO database 
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The conceptual diagram on figure 2 is implemented inside the GERICO database as shown on figure 3. The 
compartments are represented using different colors and buttons represent the safety barriers associated with each 
episode.  
An example of a mitigation measure description sheet is shown in figure 4. Each measure is characterized by a 
generic description, an objective in relation with the associated episode, an application phase, an indicative 
qualitative cost with comments, an indicative duration of deployment and implementation with comments, the 
maturity of the measure with identified gaps, and references. All this information is devised to facilitate the choice 
of the appropriate measure under a given situation. 
 
 
Figure 4: description sheet for the Hydraulic barrier in the GERICO database 
3.2. Remediation measures 
In figure 5 is represented the conceptual model for the migration of CO2 inside an aquifer. The represented 
impacts are:  
1. Acidification of the aquifer and mobilization of trace elements 
2. Corrosion of alimentation wells following a mobilization of heavy metals 
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3. Pollution of groundwater extracted for consumption or other uses 
4. Pollution of surface water 
5. Damaging of aquatic habitats 
6. Pollution of alluvial deposits 
7. Direct or indirect ingestion by the population 
 
The associated measures are: 
1. Measures that control the source of the impact (i.e. the trace elements pollution or the acidity) 
1.1. treatment of acidity and of CO2 (e.g. use of lime or “pump & treat” techniques) 
1.2. treatment of mobilized metals (e.g. electrokinetic extraction) 
2. Measures to control the transfer of the pollution (e.g. permeable reactive barrier or physical containment of 
the pollutant) 
 
 
Figure 5: conceptual model for the migration of CO2 inside an aquifer 
4. Discussion and perspectives 
The EU directive on CCS [1] explicitly distinguishes two kinds of risk mitigation measures: 
 measures that prevent significant irregularities (whose description is required in the permit application), 
 corrective measures (detailed in a plan, as explained in the introduction). 
In addition, CO2 storage activities are explicitly covered by the directive on environmental liability [10] that 
distinguishes two other kinds of measures: 
 preventive measures (aiming at preventing an imminent threat of environmental damage); 
 remedial measures (aiming at restoring, rehabilitating damaged natural resources). 
In relation to our work, what we called “remediation measures” is very close to the “remedial measures”. But the 
difference is unclear between “preventive measures” as of [10] and the mitigation measures as of [1]. We hence 
chose not to differentiate the measures, and all of them are called “mitigation measures” in the database. In order to 
keep a distinction between “preventive” and “corrective”, each episode is linked with 2 buttons as it can be seen in 
figure 3. Each button gives a link to measures that can be taken respectively before or after the episode occurs. 
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Difficulties may arise when an episode is not exactly datable, as is the case with the episode “Ignorance of the 
presence of abandoned wells” in figure 2. Here, it is difficult to choose with which button the measure 
“Investigations for possible abandoned wells” should be associated. Having only one button for all measures 
associated with an episode would be a potential solution, if each measure has an indication on its applicability i.e. 
“before”, “after”, “both” or “N/A”.  
Moreover, this problem is strongly linked with the choice of the ACCESS© software, which lacks in flexibility 
concerning the display of the bow-tie diagrams, as it can be seen for example on figure 3. As for now, the database 
is still under development; our goal is to make it available on the web using for instance an ORACLE-type 
database. The database would then be hosted by a server and the web display would allow for more options. 
As mentioned above, the diagrams presented here do not take into account the long term behaviour of the storage 
complex, though risk management will still be of prime importance in the post-closure phase. We are currently 
working on a third kind of diagrams focused on this phase. The next step will be to initiate thoughts on potential 
mitigation measures, taking into account that fewer possibilities for mitigation will be available in the long term, 
since wells will no longer be accessible for instance. 
Lastly, an integrated risk management database should take into account the monitoring system that is 
inextricably linked with the detection of irregularities and the associated mitigation measures. This will be 
investigated in future tasks. 
5. Conclusion 
In comparison with a simple list of all mitigation measures available, the GERICO database is particularly useful 
for identifying the mitigation measures only relevant to one particular risk scenario. Besides, ranking the most 
appropriate measures according to the situation is facilitated by the different information contained in the database. 
These capabilities are essential particularly for operators willing to prepare a corrective measures plan, as required 
by the European directive on CCS [1] or by authorities appointed to review the permit applications. In addition, 
when the database will be made available on the web, the GERICO will be useful for non-specialists in order to 
have an overview of risk mitigation measures and for CO2 storage scientists looking for a state-of-the-art in the area. 
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